The Machiavellian frontier of stable mechanisms
Qiufu Chen; Yuanmei Li; Xiaopeng Yin; Luosai Zhang; Siyi Zhou · 2024 · arXiv
WASTE classifies this as Negative / Null Result Report · AI classification, approximate
The study found no significant effect — useful as a negative control or null benchmark for your own design.
Abstract (excerpt)
The impossibility theorem in Roth (1982) states that no stable mechanism satisfies strategy-proofness. This paper explores the Machiavellian frontier of stable mechanisms by weakening strategy-proofness. For a fixed mechanism $\varphi$ and a true preference profile $\succ$, a $(\varphi,\succ)$-boost mispresentation of agent i is a preference of i that is obtained by (i) raising the ranking of the truth-telling assignment $\varphi_i(\succ)$, and (ii) keeping rankings unchanged above the new position of this truth-telling assignment. We require a matching mechanism $\varphi$ neither punish nor r
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Metadata source: arXiv